Monday, May 22, 2017

A 2020 Presidential Primary in Colorado

This is part one in a series of posts about 2017 legislation seeking to alter state laws concerning the timing of presidential primary elections or caucuses. 

A careful reading of the set up post to this piece is revealing of an omission to the group of states that made caucus-to-primary shifts in 2016. While Maine and Minnesota took more conventional routes -- passing legislation establishing presidential primary elections to replace caucuses -- Colorado voters took an atypical path in the state's switch to a presidential primary for the 2020 cycle.

And it is not that Colorado legislators had not tried to make the change. Efforts in both 2015 and 2016 languished in the committees to which they were referred and died when their respective sessions adjourned. In addition, the 2016 bill was introduced with the 2016 caucuses process in the Centennial state as the backdrop. That "debacle" featured a state Democratic party overwhelmed by a large turnout (and other subsequent problems) and Republican process that elected delegates but without an attendant preference vote for president. The result was that Coloradans of all political stripes were left unsatisfied with the process.

Enough were disenchanted and organized -- even in the time in mid-spring around which the 2016 presidential primary legislation was introduced -- that an initiative was approved and added to the November general election ballot. When the legislative effort failed, then, there was a citizen-driven effort, approved by the Colorado secretary of state, to fill the void. That initiative, Proposition 107, easily passed.

The practical effect was that 107's passage brought Colorado in line with Maine and Minnesota. Whereas all three states have had presidential primaries in the past, all three have been caucus states over at least the last four cycles. And like those other two caucus-turned-primary states, Colorado made the switch, but did not specify a date on which it would regularly occur. Instead, the new law as approved by the voters ceded the date-setting authority to the governor of Colorado, but with significant limitations.

The guidance provided allows the governor to set the date of the primary on a Tuesday 1) not before the earliest date allowed by the national parties and 2) no later than the third Tuesday in March. That gives the state some leeway, but not much. Before September 1 of the year prior to the presidential election, the Colorado governor will have the ability to set the date of the primary on the first, second or third Tuesday in March.1 Together, all three weeks saw a significant chunk of delegates allocated in 2016. That window was a clustered area on the 2016 primary calendar, but one in which the Colorado caucuses were scheduled anyway.

All of that is simple enough. First, there is a switch in Colorado from a caucus to a primary. And additionally, that contest will be conducted during the first three weeks of March 2020. However, there are at least a couple of relevant caveats for which to account.

1) This is not the only instance of a state that arrived at a presidential primary by a voter-driven initiative. Washington is another example, and the experience in the Evergreen state over the last 25 years is instructive if not cautionary. Washington has held its presidential primaries in that time but the state parties there have often held the contest at arms length. The Republican Party has only partially and occasionally used the contest as a means of allocating its national convention delegates. This past cycle, 2016, was the first time in the Washington primary era that the party used the primary results to guide the allocation of all of its delegates.

The Democratic Party has been worse. In that time, the party has only ever utilized the primary as a beauty contest, most often occurring after the first determining step of the delegate allocation process (the precinct caucuses). Delegates, then, have been allocated based on the state party-run caucuses rather than the primary.

One could potentially see the partisan roles reversed in Colorado. Democrats spearheaded the early legislative efforts in the Centennial state to trade in the caucuses for a primary. But a small number of Republicans in the state legislature were able to kill those bills in committee. Moreover, Colorado Republicans not only opted for closed caucuses in 2016, but chose to eliminate the preference vote at the precinct level in an attempt to continue the state party tradition of sending an unbound delegation to the Republican National Convention. A higher turnout primary among Republicans much less the independents now allowed to participate may be more than the party wants.

Could the Colorado Republican Party opt out of the primary in the way that Washington Democrats have?

The answer appears to be no. On the one hand, Colorado Republicans could take the state to court on freedom of association grounds since under the guidelines of the new primary law, independents are allowed to participate. Neither chair from either of Colorado's two major parties was a fan of that part of the change in the lead up to the election last November.

Possible court challenges aside, there is a further complication for Colorado Republicans; one not faced by Washington Democrats. Historically, Colorado has been one of the few states where state legal code affected things like the timing of caucuses. In most caucus states, that is a matter solely left up to the state parties. But in Colorado, state law described the parameters under which caucuses were conducted. That is part of the reason both parties there held caucuses on the same night in 2016.      Both parties have also historically followed the letter of the law that part of the statute.

But it, too, was altered by the ballot initiative voters passed in November 2016. Rather than giving the parties the option of the first Tuesday in February or March to hold caucuses, the new law lays out a Saturday after the primary date for party precinct caucuses (to begin the process of selecting delegates). That is an important change. If the parties had maintained the option of holding earlier caucuses, Colorado Republicans could have opted into that type of contest in lieu of the later primary.

That is, of course, assuming the party chose to replicate its 2016 strategy: caucuses without preference votes. And again, that was practice was at least part of the rationale driving the ballot initiative in reestablishing the presidential primary in 2016.

But that February option is off the table. It is no longer in the statute. And without it, Colorado Republicans would be forced, under Republican National Committee delegate selection rules, to allocate delegates based on the initial statewide contest, in this case the primary.

2) One additional, far less detailed caveat, is that the Colorado General Assembly during its 2017 session tweaked the law adopted via the November ballot initiative. And the emphasis is on the word "tweak". This was not an effort to repeal or reverse the changes coming from Proposition 107 as has happened elsewhere. Instead, the move in Colorado was to clean up and clarify a number of points. For our purposes, the changes were twofold.

First, the legislature empowered the secretary of state along with the governor to settle on the date of the presidential primary. Technically, the pair could be from different parties which could present either benefits or challenges. The more practical rationale behind the move is to bring into the process the main election administrator in the state.

SB 17-305 also clarified the protocol by which the state is to handle the participation of voters unaffiliated with either of the two major parties (who are now allowed to participate in the presidential primary).

Governor Hickenlooper (D) signed SB 17-305 into law on May 19, 2017 and it will likely take effect in August.

1 This assumes that the national parties maintain their preference for non-carve-out states to begin holding primaries and caucuses on the first Tuesday in March and after. If that changes, then the Colorado window could expand or contract.

Sunday, May 21, 2017

2020 Presidential Primary Movement: Expectations Setting

With state legislatures across the country at various stages of winding down their work for 2017, FHQ should do what it should have done at the outset of those bodies convening earlier this year. Mainly, that means putting together an outlook of what one might anticipate with respect to their efforts at scheduling or repositioning presidential primary elections for the 2020 cycle. Consider this -- even retrospectively -- as a set of guidelines.

First, one does tend to see more action in odd numbered years. However, the year after a presidential election is usually a period when the urgency to shift the dates of presidential nomination contests is, if not at its nadir, then quite low compared to other windows of time. There may be some lingering sentiment to reorder the primary calendar in the time immediately after a presidential election cycle among constituents and legislators alike -- when the most recently completed presidential nomination process is still fresh on the minds of both -- but that does not often lead to actual changes.

More often, any leftover feelings from and about the previous process make their way into proposed/introduced legislation that ends up much further down the list of legislative priorities for the majority of legislators. To put it in language that FHQ often uses, there may be a willingness to improve the lot of a state and its presidential primary position among a handful of legislators but they rarely have the ability to translate that into passed and signed legislation. Again, there are bigger fish to fry for most legislators coming off an election of their own. As in Washington, the time to move on legislative priorities -- especially if they are large in scope -- is early.

None of this is to suggest that one does not see any activity. Rather, there are factors that tend to limit that action in the year after a presidential election. The convergence of legislative willingness and ability to alter the timing of a presidential primary election tends to occur when that aforementioned urgency is raised. And that most often occurs not in the year after the last presidential election cycle, but in the year before the next presidential election cycle.

Very simply, the timing of the next presidential primary election is a bigger priority to state-level actors in the period just before the next primary season. Incidentally, that is also a period in which there is much more data available legislatures considering a move; data on the political climate that may hover over the next nomination process, data on what the national party delegate selection rules will be, and emerging data on who may be actually running for the nomination(s).

Political climate is a bit of a catch-all. Midterm elections do not necessarily portend what is to come in the next presidential election cycle. An out-party that flips control of one or more houses of Congress will not always be able to parlay that into taking back the White House two years later. That does not mean that there is nothing that can be taken from those midterms for the next cycle. It is just that what take-home messages are produced -- again, with respect to the movement of presidential primary elections -- happens at the state level and not at the national level (or because of how state-level actors read or react to what is happening nationally).

One example of this comes from a factor that FHQ has mentioned in a recent series of posts about the current efforts to move the California presidential primary for 2020. That potential calendar change and possible Democratic state government gains (both gubernatorial and state legislative) in 2018 may lead to a heightened desire among those out-party governors/legislators to reshuffle the primary calendar deck in 2020. That desire does not exist now. In 2017, with Republicans in control of an overwhelming number of state legislatures across the country, primary calendar positioning is even further down the list of priorities. There is little desire -- little urgency -- among most Republicans state legislators to alter 2020 presidential primary election dates. In 2019, that picture may be different.

And bear in mind that political climate is more than merely what can be read from a midterm election. That election provides a snapshot in an ever-evolving time series, but one that can confirm or refute the (whether real or perceived) trajectory of the balance of power between the two major parties. All of this is perhaps a long-winded way of saying that a change in partisan control in states across the country may affect the extent to which primary election positioning is a priority in 2019 when the majority of those decisions tend to or will be made.

Beyond the climate, the national party rules also matter in this mosaic. A rules change in 2018 may affect or even prompt state-level changes in 2019. And there is recent precedence for this. Democrats allowed February contests starting in 2004. That had the effect of inviting states to schedule earlier contests that cycle; something that bore fruit in 2004, but saw much more movement four years later. Both parties informally agreeing to a rough primary calendar outline after 2008 additionally forced some of those same states that had moved for 2004 and 2008 to reconsider their positions. It took that informal coordination and some tweaking on penalties across a couple of cycles -- 2012 and 2016 -- to carve out February for just Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada and South Carolina. That left the remaining states to pick and choose spots in the March to June window.

Those sorts of changes to the national party rules on timing may affect what states do thereafter. So, too, might national party incentives/penalties concerning delegate allocation (winner-take-all, proportional, etc.) or participation (open, closed, etc.) affect state-level decision making.

Finally, perceptions of who may or may not run for a presidential nomination are more concrete in the year before a presidential election than just after the last one. That may affect decision making in the home states/regions of prospective candidates. Think southern Democratic-controlled states attempting to fashion a calendar that would produce a more moderate nominee in 1988 or the moves by legislators in Illinois in 2007 to benefit Barack Obama. Yes, this is a factor that is narrower in terms of its reach, but it is a variable in all of this nonetheless.

Now, the above description paints a picture of a process that will unfold not now but in a couple of years. That is still mostly true. To the degree there have been or will be changes to the presidential primary calendar, it most of it will happen in 2019. However, 2016 witnessed caucus to primary shifts in both Maine and Minnesota. And 2017 has not been without some activity. The efforts in California are the most prominent, but there are and were attempts elsewhere. In the coming days, FHQ will take a tour through the country and discuss the attempts in states where the issue of presidential primary timing has been raised. It is a story marked by legislation that has mostly lain fallow since introduction and/or has been bottled up in committee. Again, there is a willingness but lacking ability to affect change in state legislatures this early. There are, however, exceptions to this rule.


Thursday, May 18, 2017

Is Frontloading a Real Issue for 2020?

Recently, in a couple of posts about the possibility of California shifting up the date of its next presidential primary, FHQ mentioned that any move in the Golden state alters the delegate allocation calculus. And that is true. Any time a state worth approximately ten percent of the total number of delegates uproots its primary and moves it to another spot on the calendar, that has implications for how candidates and campaigns approach the primary phase of the presidential nomination process.

Moreover, I went on to note that these decisions -- and especially one out of such a delegate-rich state as California -- do not happen in a vacuum. Other states, or rather political actors in them, take notice. Again, if past is a guide, then California changes cause other states to reconsider their positions on the calendar.

But past is not always prologue. And that prompted James Pindell of the Boston Globe to ask a variation of the title question in an email exchange we had last week. Is frontloading a real issue?

To start, the true response to that question is, "I don't know." I don't. When and if California does bump its primary up from June to March, states will begin testing that hypothesis. And the true test will be in 2019, the year before the next presidential election (a time when most of the decisions on presidential primary movement tend to occur).

One response to a California move is the one FHQ has laid out: a big, delegate-rich state shifts to an earlier point on the calendar and sets off a sort of chain reaction similar to what happened in both 2000 and 2008. But Pindell was right to push back against that as the only explanation. It can also be persuasively argued that some of the lessons learned from the de facto national primary experience in February 2008 included some form of, "We spent all of that money to hold an earlier presidential primary and/or got lost in the shuffle of 20 or more states."

In other words, "Maybe we should [have] save[d] some money and/or [have] be[en] more selective about where our primary ends up on the calendar." After all, that is the same retrospective, fight the last war mindset under which the national parties operate in their rules decision-making. State legislators, like those decision-makers within the national parties, can only use the data they have, and the most recent data -- the experience in the most recent cycle -- often colors the decisions made.

All of that was particularly true following 2008. A number of states, Arkansas, California and New Jersey among them, that were part of the Titanic Tuesday on February 5, 2008 opted to revert to later dates in 2012. However, one external factor forced states to revisit their calendar positions in 2012: the national parties informally coordinated a more uniform primary calendar. The practical implication was something FHQ discussed for much of 2011. States that had held February contests in 2008 had to change their dates because February was off limits to all but Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada and South Carolina under the national party rules in 2012.

Those that did not abandon their February dates ran the risk of taking the delegate hit that Florida, Arizona and Michigan ultimately took heading in the 2012 primary season. Yes, those three states and a number of additional non-binding caucus states broke or skirted the rules and held contests in the late January through February period. Yet, the vast majority of formerly February primary states saw the new national party delegate selection rules and sought relief from possible sanctions in the form of later primary dates.

So, rather than cast 2012 primary movement at the state level as solely a function of financial/budgetary concerns, it is more all-encompassing to frame it as, "Well, if we have to move anyway because of rules changes, why not just (re)consolidate our primaries in the traditional later positions and save some money in the process?" That was the case in states like Arkansas, California and New Jersey.

But other states had a different decision-making calculus; one dominated by partisan state government control. Among those formerly February primary states, if the state was Republican-controlled, it was more likely to shift back, but shift back to a lesser degree than Democratic-controlled states. Those Republican states tended to shift from February to March while the Democratic states pushed back even further to April or later. The impetus for that was that 1) Republicans saw significant gains at the state government level in the 2010 midterms and 2) the Republican Party was the only party with an active presidential nomination race in 2012.

The lesson of de facto national primary in 2008, then, is a bit more complicated. And, in fact, in 2016  there was some potential unraveling of it. On the one hand, the national parties crafted rules that brought repeat offenders like Florida, Arizona and Michigan in line. The parties got what they wanted there: a clear February for the four carve-out states. But those three offending states made minimal regressive pushes. All three ended up at various positions in March and were joined from the other end of the calendar by states that got lumped into the SEC primary narrative (with minimal legislative action). Alabama moved up a week from its 2012 position, the Arkansas legislature shifted a consolidated primary from late May to March, and Texas reverted to its March date in 2016 after courts mandated a May 2012 primary because of a redistricting dispute. North Carolina also took a circuitous route to a mid-March primary date in 2016.

The Florida, Arizona and Michigan shifts are one thing. Each was already early in 2012 and stayed that way in 2016 relative to most states. All three remained around the 50% delegates allocated mark on the calendar. But Texas and North Carolina played a role in where that point on the calendar ended up by clustering in March 2016.

If California ends up in March 2020, then that mark shifts up even further.

And that brings this discussion full circle back to the question that Pindell posed. Would other states move to earlier dates for 2020 because of that prospective California-enhanced clustering? While that is a question that is affected by partisan concerns (the balance of power after the 2018 midterms) and budgetary limitations (consolidating, separating and funding primary elections), part of the answer will also be based on the perceptions of 2020 within the various state houses across the country.

When these presidential primary scheduling bills come up in state legislative committee hearings or on the floor of a state House or Senate, the resulting discussions are rarely about delegate math or where the state is or would be positioned on the calendar relative to some seemingly arbitrary 50% delegates allocated mark. Most state legislators just do not have the time, energy or inclination to be that savvy about a primary date. Instead, the talk is about the economics of attention-seeking. Sure, there is some griping about Iowa and New Hampshire. What primary scheduling discussion would be complete without that? But most of them involve a serious discussion about how a move to a date clustered with regional partners or alone would grab the attention of the candidates and the media. That not only forces the candidates to address issues that are important to the state/region, but also means the candidates and media will spend money in the state as the campaigns sweep through.

Part of the state legislative decision-making calculus ahead of 2020 will be the perception of how 2020 may proceed. If the current conventional wisdom holds, then 2020 will be a year with a wide open Democratic field of candidates that forces a race that lasts the whole length of the primary calendar. Moves like the ostensible shift in California can potentially disrupt that conventional wisdom (as can the nascent national party delegate selection rules).

If that feeling holds -- that regardless of California's move, the Democratic race is destined to be competitive throughout -- then there is little urgency to move to an earlier date. There will be attention to seek wherever a state sits on the calendar. However, the motivation to frontload increases when and if the feeling changes to one where the race will end sooner rather than later. [Or if, say, a number of (newly) Democratic-controlled state governments opt for earlier dates so as not to cede influence to other states/regions. And/or alternatively, if the feeling, as ahead of 2004, is "wrap this race up and focus on a general election against an embattled incumbent".] Attention-seeking states under those conditions would be more likely to move up, if they are willing and able, to take any piece of the pie rather than hold steady on a later date and run the perceived risk of getting nothing. Something -- even if it means advertising dollars spent in local markets and not actual candidates on the ground [Visits are finite.] -- is better than nothing.

So, is frontloading an issue for 2020? The answer now is unclear, but hinges greatly on both partisan control on the state level following the 2018 midterms and the perception (in 2019) about how long the race will remain competitive. A California shift potentially affects that latter variable, feeding a possible frontloading contagion.

Friday, May 5, 2017

Democratic Unity Reform Commission, Meeting #1, Day #1

The Democratic National Committee continued its path toward developing the rules that will govern 2020 presidential nomination process.

And if you came looking for fireworks on day one of the Unity Reform Commission (URC), you left disappointed. The group convened for the first time on Friday, picking up where the Rules Committee at the Democratic National Convention that chartered the committee left off.

This meeting, and likely part two tomorrow, will not be about setting any rules. Instead, the atmosphere among the 21 members -- minus two today -- was cordial. It was, after all, more of a preliminary meeting than anything else.

The usual suspects came up in presentations and subsequent discussions about the legal parameters of the nomination process and the history and evolution of the rules. There was a smattering of complaints about the privileged positions of Iowa and New Hampshire and the timing of delegate selection events generally, chatter about devising best practices for caucus states, and, of course, some mention of the place of superdelegates in the Democratic nomination process. Larry Cohen, Vice Chair of the URC and current Chair of Our Revolution, even reined in the group on superdelegates, cautioning that the group's next meeting (not tomorrow, but the next time they convene) will deal with that subject.

And overall, that was pretty much that. This was an introductory meeting that found the group more or less feeling each other out.

FHQ had a recent discussion with someone in the Democratic Party, and we were talking about expectations for the URC. The point that I made then would reiterate at this juncture is that successful rules making from this group will be measured by the extent to which they are able to avoid items falling into the familiar Clinton/Sanders divide. If this becomes a process dominated by the rules decided along (intra)party lines, then it is likely to end bitterly. In the paraphrased words of a disappointed Sanders supporter at the convention last summer in Philadelphia, "These commissions are where reform goes to die." Perhaps, but it does not necessarily have to be or end that way.

But as the rules-making process on the Republican side over the last two cycles will demonstrate, it is difficult to avoid factions developing in a process that is viewed as extremely important among elites/activists within the parties' coalitions.

The second part of the first URC meeting will be tomorrow. FHQ will be on hand for that as well. Whether I have a wrap up post on that session depends on the ground covered, but I will provide commentary on Twitter in real time as well.

California Primary to March?

It looks that way.

The question that remains after competing bills passed each house in the state legislature on May 4 is exactly where in March the primary ends up in 2020. The Assembly bill -- AB 84 -- is the more straightforward of the two. It shifts a consolidated California primary back into the first Tuesday (after the first Monday) in March position the Golden state primary occupied during the 2000 and 2004 cycles.

Alternatively, the Senate version -- SB 568 -- is a bit more complex. On the surface, it stakes out a less ambitious, third Tuesday in March spot on the calendar. However, it also gives the California governor the option of bumping the primary up to an even earlier position. Now, given current national party timing penalties on presidential primaries, anything earlier than the first Tuesday in March is a non-starter. That gubernatorial power is rendered mostly powerless; except granting the executive branch the ability to move the primary up as early as the date called for in the Assembly legislation.

While it is true that a version of this March primary legislation has passed each chamber of the California state legislature, one version obviously still has to pass the opposite house and be signed into law. The first of those seems more likely than not, but the gubernatorial signature is not assured (though admittedly likely given the synchronicity of an open 2020 Democratic presidential nomination and Democrats' unified control in the Golden state).

The likelihood of a move, then is quite high. That carries with it a couple of additional notes worth mentioning here.

First, this move would be on the early side. While some states schedule their presidential primaries for the next cycle before the midterm year, it is exception rather than rule. The vast majority states hold off on acting until the timing of the presidential primary is actually on most legislators radar. Occasionally, that is immediately after a presidential election year, but more often than not, the urgency is higher after the midterms and more importantly after the national parties have set their delegate selection rules for the upcoming cycle.

Since this California move would be made earlier than is typical, the legislature would theoretically have the ability to move again. That is probably not likely this time around, but it should be noted that California shifted from March to June after 2004 before moving again -- from June to February -- ahead of the 2008 cycle. All the incentives are to move earlier, and in this 2020 case, California will already be as early as it possibly can be. Unless the national parties seek to penalize March primaries, then, California would be unlikely to pull up the tent stakes and move again; this time to a later date.

Additionally, a California push into March has a certain gravitational pull to it. In delegates terms, the cache of delegates in California represented nearly seven percent of the total number of Republican delegates in 2016 and nearly 11.5 percent on the Democratic side. That is a level of delegate-richness that brings other states along for the ride. That happened in 1996, 2000 and 2008 -- all cycles that witnessed California shifting to an earlier primary date.

While there are only a handful of states with unified Democratic control now -- and thus have less motivation to move -- that may be different after the 2018 midterms. That is still a way off, but bears mention in this context. California may be alone in moving now, but would potentially pull many of those northeastern, mid-Atlantic states that shifted from February to much later dates in 2012 back into March, further frontloading the calendar.

Most of this is a story for 2019. But for now, the momentum is behind a California push into some Tuesday position in March.

Thursday, April 27, 2017

North Carolina Presidential Primary Bill Unanimously Passes State Senate

If one goes on headlines alone, then SB 655 passing the North Carolina state senate with no dissent is a rather mundane if not arcane legislative action. However, as is often the case, there is some nuance to what Tar Heel state legislators in the state's upper chamber accomplished.

The accomplishment?

The state senate passed legislation setting the date of a consolidated primary -- presidential, state and local primaries -- for the first Tuesday after the first Monday in March.

Of course, the real value in this bill is certainty. By selecting a fixed date, legislators eliminated the atypical biennial rotation the North Carolina primary was stuck in after the passage of an omnibus elections law package in 2013. For much of the post-reform era -- 1972 to now -- North Carolina has had a consolidated primary election. And for much of that period, the Tar Heel state was rooted on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in May. Since the state concurrently held all of its primaries, the state enjoyed a smaller budgetary hit as compared to states with separated presidential and state/local primaries; two separate elections to fund. Granted, the trade-off was that North Carolina witnessed an increasing number of states shift to ever-earlier dates on the presidential primary calendar over the course of that period.

But the elections package the North Carolina General Assembly passed in 2013 altered that. First, it separated the presidential primary from the primaries for other offices and tethered it to the fluid, but protected early presidential primary calendar date of the South Carolina presidential primary.1 In other words, there was no North Carolina primary scheduled until there was a South Carolina primary scheduled.

Moreover, this was a provocative action on the part of Republicans holding unified control of not only the General Assembly but including the governor's mansion as well. Being tethered to the early, but unknown date of the South Carolina primary meant that the newly separate North Carolina presidential primary would run afoul of national party rules governing the timing of presidential primaries and caucuses. The severe delegate penalties the state potentially faced in that too early primary forced legislators back into action in 2015. To avoid those penalties, North Carolina legislators settled on a couple of tweaks. The first was to set the date of the presidential primary for March 15, while the second was to reconsolidate all of the primaries (but in March).

However, that move was only temporary. It affected only the primaries in 2016. That sunset provision expired at the end of the year and the primaries reverted to their post-2013 state: a tethered North Carolina presidential primary and May primaries for other offices. This is a messy, irregular manner in which to schedule and conduct elections. The practical effect since the 2013 changes has been to have the other primaries in May during midterm years and in flux during presidential years due to the statute's treatment of the presidential primary. If it is unknown when the presidential primary will be under current law, then there will be uncertainty as to whether there will be a move later to reconsolidate the primaries on an earlier date.

Again, this is complicated.

But state Senator Andrew Brock's (R-34th, Davie, Rowan) SB 655 streamlines all of it. The bill proposes shifting up the date of the primaries for other offices by two months in all even years (covering presidential and midterm years) and consolidates the presidential primary with them every four years. Further, the legislation would remove the Tar Heel state from the list of potential troublemakers for 2020. The national parties would have no need penalize North Carolina if its primary was scheduled on the earliest date allowed under the rules in both parties.2

More importantly, perhaps, the change would align the North Carolina presidential primary with primaries in neighboring states (Tennessee, Virginia and likely Georgia). Alabama and Texas also have primaries scheduled for that date at this time. All were part of the first iteration of the SEC primary in 2016. Adding North Carolina would shift the delegates of the tenth most populous state -- a not insubstantial number of delegates -- into the fifth slot on the calendar. In 2016, that was a position on the calendar on which the 25% delegates allocated mark was passed.

Without passing too much judgment, this move to simplify the primary schedule is a win for elections administrators in the state as well as voters. And given the unanimity of support in the state Senate, legislators on some level see it that way too.

1 The legislation and ultimately the law actually left the presidential primary in May unless South Carolina had a primary before March 15. Given the first in the South status the Palmetto state primary has enjoyed in both parties since 2006, it was a virtual certainty that that North Carolina provision would be triggered. And that would have the effect of shifting North Carolina to the Tuesday following the South Carolina primary.

2 It is still early in the 2020 cycle, but there is no indication that either party is looking to alter the basic primary calendar structure: carve-out states in February followed by all other states within a March to early June window.

Wednesday, April 12, 2017

California and the 2020 Prime Time Primary

Legislators in California are eyeing an earlier position on the 2020 presidential primary calendar.

There has been legislation (SB 568) to do something with the California presidential primary that has been active in the Golden state legislature since February. Amendments quietly added at the end of March garnered more attention yesterday with a press release from the secretary of state and the bill's author in the state Senate.

The change? Move California's June primary up in the process. But not just move it up, shift it into a position on the heels of Iowa and New Hampshire at the front of the 2020 queue.

In reality, this sounds more provocative than it actually is. This is not Florida or Michigan moving into January for the 2008 cycle. Instead, the California maneuvering is more subtle, yet motivated by the similar reasoning. States, regardless of size, mainly want a couple of things out of the presidential nomination process: 1) their voters to have a say in the identity of the nominees and 2) to have the candidates pay some attention to -- spend money and time on -- them.

The best ways to accomplish those two goals are to be early and/or to have a specific spot on the calendar for your contest and your contest alone. Iowa and New Hampshire, and since 2008, Nevada and South Carolina have each of those in spades. There are many reasons for that, but currently, the important fact is that all four are protected by the delegate selection rules of the national parties. Without a change there -- to the national party rules -- efforts by California or any other state to move up usually means settling for the earliest allowed date after the four carve-out states or taking a substantial penalty. The former is an attractive gathering point for other states, which gets them early but not alone. And the latter -- the penalty -- reduces a state's clout, affecting the campaigns' calculi in approaching the state.

This is what happened when the California state legislature shifted the Golden state primary in both 2000 and 2008. California was early in both cases, but shared the date with numerous other states, giving campaigns options in terms of where and how to expend the finite resources at their disposal. These are not problems unique to the Golden state.

What is unique in California's case is its size. But the number, diversity and wealth of the population are both blessing and curse. Enough wealth is concentrated in the state that the candidates of all stripes have been more than willing to come into the state early to raise funds. But then they go spend it elsewhere; Iowa and New Hampshire chief among the recipients. Californians have often bemoaned this ATM treatment, and have at various points (1996, 2000, 2008) seen their legislatures seek a different relationship; a different, earlier position on the calendar that allows both fundraising and fund spending in the state. But again, all of those experiments got the state early, but not alone.

And the proposed 2016 experiment will not end any differently.

Let's game this out in a way that the proponents of this legislation have only partially thought out.

First, the SB 568 moves not only the California presidential primary to the third Tuesday in March, but everything else traditionally scheduled for June. That spares the state the $100 million plus price tag of a separate presidential primary, but also creates extended general election campaigns for all those down ballot who win February or March primaries.

But the legislation also provides another scheduling option on top of that baseline March primary date. Like other states which have mimicked New Hampshire to some degree, the California bill grants an individual -- not the state legislature -- the final say in the matter. States like Arizona, Georgia and New Mexico have experimented with allowing one individual -- typically the secretary of state as in New Hampshire, or the governor -- set the date of the presidential primary. In those cases the state legislature ceded the power to an executive branch actor in order to streamline the date setting process. It is understating things, but the legislative process can be messy and slow, and a political question like when a presidential primary should be held can trigger divisions that can derail legislation. Legislatures across the country are also not always in session during the second half of a year. That time constraint often compounds the problem of a glacial legislative process.

To be more nimble and reactive, then, a handful of state legislatures have given up the date-setting powers, granting them to an individual not hampered by internal division nor similar time constraints.

This California proposal partially ventures down the same road. The legislature sets the mid-March date, but gives the governor the ability to shift the primary up even further by proclamation. This is where most of the quick reaction analysis on this legislation has ended; with California's governor of the future hypothetically moving the California primary into the third position on the calendar behind Iowa and New Hampshire.

But there is more to the story than that.

This future California governor, if empowered by the provisions of this bill, is not unfettered. He or she would have to make a decision on the date a full 240 days prior to the proposed new/earlier presidential primary date. Now, if it is assumed that Iowa and New Hampshire will fall roughly in the same spots on the calendar as each did in 2016, then the calendar looks something like this (on the Democratic side) in 2020:

Monday, February 3: Iowa
Tuesday, February 11: New Hampshire
Tuesday, February 18: California
Saturday, February 22: Nevada
Saturday, February 29: South Carolina

Of course, it is anything but assured that the four carve-outs will be in those positions come 2020. And the reason why is because of ambitious states like California that introduce uncertainty into the process of the calendar coming together. Since that uncertainty has been routinized -- not to mention counterbalanced by national party rules -- the early four states usually hold off on formally scheduling their contests until the fall in the year prior to the presidential election. In other words, those states will not have official dates until fall 2019. Keep that in mind.

That affects California. If the governor waited until the end of September to set a date around the same time that the carve-outs settle on their own dates, then the 240 day buffer provision would mean that the earliest the future California governor could schedule the presidential primary for would be the very end of May. That would default to basically the same position California occupies now on the calendar.

But the reality of the provision is that it calls for the governor to move the date up from mid-March to an earlier date, not a later one. The 240 day buffer means the governor cannot wait to the fall to make a decision alongside Iowa, New Hampshire and the others. Waiting means giving up that power and falling back on the baseline March date the legislators are attempting to establish.

And making a decision earlier means the governor would be making the decision earlier and with less than complete information. To schedule a February 18 primary, a decision would have to be made by late June. A number of state legislatures will be out of session by that time and that may cut down on any potential clustering around a February 18 California primary. But that would be a decision that would give the carve-out states plenty of time to react accordingly and schedule their contests ahead of California.

That all leads to one conclusion: The third spot is out of the question for California.

The best they can hope for is fifth; playing the Florida role from 2012. That is the "we don't want to be first, we want to be early all by ourselves" argument. California's proposal logistically prevents it from getting the third slot, and the national party rules, unless amended, will prevent it from claiming a spot that is fifth in the order and before March. California could move up to the first Tuesday in March, but as the earliest date allowed by the national parties, that is a date that California would share with a number of other states, just like the 2000 and 2008 experiments.

What in the national party rules would prevent California from going before March? Penalties. Now, the national party rules can change and likely will in the coming months. But there is no apparent desire to alter basic framework of the calendar: carve-outs in February and everyone else between March and early June. A rules-defying February primary would cost California half of their delegates on the Democratic side and would reduce the Republican delegation from 172 to 12, a 93 percent reduction. Additionally, any Democratic candidates who campaign in a rogue California would lose any delegates won from the reduced pool. In that scenario, California could move up, be early and alone. Alone on the calendar and alone in terms of candidates spending time and money there.

This is a long and winding path with exit ramps that end in dead ends.

One cannot fault California legislators for walking down this path. They are not alone, and have adopted some innovations from other states. Still, the thinking is old and somewhat outdated. The race to the front is one that cannot be won. However, there are alternatives. A savvier approach might be to choose a spot on the calendar that is pretty barren. There is a lot of space in early and mid-April that could potentially benefit California. No, the primary would not be among the first to winnow the field, but it could serve as a knockout blow in the race for the nomination. Sure, proportional rules on the Democratic side work against that theory as does California's size. An April California primary would give those mid-Atlantic/northeastern states with later April primaries pause. California's gravitational pull in the delegate math means that states that want to give their voters a say -- any say -- in the nominations would want to be before a state as delegate-rich as California.

Even that route is fraught with peril and uncertainty. And keep in mind that the proposed proclamation power would only allow the governor to move the date up, not back to April. It really is a toothless provision.

So, third Tuesday in March? Set the date. Join Illinois. Join Arizona.

Tuesday, November 8, 2016

2016 Election Night

11/28/16 3:30pm:
The Michigan results are certified, handing the Great Lakes state to Trump.

11/14/16 5:30pm:
The Trump camp failed to request a recount in New Hampshire before the 5pm deadline. Clinton takes the Granite state's four electoral votes.

11/10/16 7:45pm:
Arizona added to Trump's column.

11/9/16 11:30am:
The AP calls Minnesota for Clinton. That is a narrow hold for Democrats.

11/9/16 2:40am:
Wisconsin puts Trump over the top; another flip for the Republican.

11/9/16 2:15am:
Alaska stays in the Republican column.

11/9/16 2:10am:
And the second congressional district in Nebraska is called for Trump.

11/9/16 2am:
The Maine call is in and we have the second electoral vote split in the Maine/Nebraska era. Maine's second congressional district follows Nebraska's second district in 2008 in going against the statewide result. Clinton wins the state and CD1 while Trump takes CD2.

11/9/16 1:40pm:
Pennsylvania flips to Trump. That 20 electoral votes puts Trump within range of 270 (and with some networks having called Wisconsin for him).

11/9/16 12:25am:
Clinton holds Nevada.

Trump flips Iowa; something that has been in the cards since at least the conventions. Trump also holds Georgia after a lengthy wait.

Utah goes for Trump. He will lag behind Romney there, but still take the Beehive state with relative ease.

North Carolina is a Republican hold for Trump. Oregon is another non-Rust Belt leaner to stay with the Democrats.

The next round of closings out west put California, Hawaii and Washington into the Clinton category. Trump takes Idaho. The close night in the Rust Belt extends to the electoral vote count for the time being.

Florida follows Ohio as a Trump flip. Understatement alert: That is a big one.

Colorado stays in the blue column. The outside the Rust Belt/midwest leaners are falling into place for Clinton. Those in that region are tighter.

Ohio goes to Trump and Virginia to Clinton. One of those is bigger symbolically than the other.

Missouri to Trump and New Mexico to Clinton.

Closings in Arizona, Iowa, Nevada, and Utah. No calls. Montana to Trump.

Arkansas and Louisiana turn red and Connecticut falls into Clinton's column.

An extended radio hit pulled FHQ away. We will feel in the gaps in time. As for now a big jump for both candidates.

West Virginia to Trump. North Carolina and Ohio are too close to call as of now.

Wasting no time, Indiana and Kentucky go Trump and Vermont is added to Clinton's column.

Let's color this thing in. FHQ will have maps and comments both here and on twitter (@FHQ) all evening.

Recent Posts:
The Electoral College Map (11/8/16) -- Election Day

The Electoral College Map (11/7/16)

The Electoral College Map (11/6/16)

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The Electoral College Map (11/8/16) -- Election Day

Changes (11/8/16):
Election Day.

As there were only a few more polls added to the mix on the final day of the 2016 campaign -- or in just under the wire yesterday -- there were only a few subtle changes to the figures here at FHQ. 
  • South Carolina pushed past Texas toward the partisan line on the Electoral College Spectrum below, but neither will budge from the Trump column. Both had at various points shown to be much closer than normal. Neither, however, will end up anywhere other than red as the results trickle in. 
  • Wisconsin once again traded spots with Michigan on the Spectrum. Similar to the two Trump states above, neither state seems poised to jump the partisan line away from Clinton. The trajectory of the race has headed in that general direction here at the end, but it is likely that that was more consolidation of partisan support (for Trump) than any wholesale shift away from Clinton or the Democrats. The temptation is there to suggest that the tightening in states like Michigan and Wisconsin is perhaps a reversion to the pre-Obama mean for the pair. Yet, that simply is not the case. Both are within range of exactly where they were in the Obama-Romney race four years ago.
  • The map and Watch List remained unchanged from a day ago.  

Changes since June 13 (first map of the cycle):
Rather than a noisy race, the opposite occurred instead. It has been a steady race through the lens of the graduated weighted average FHQ utilizes. Yes, that is largely a function of methodology. As the dataset grows -- as the number of polls increase -- shocks become less likely. Note, however, that even with the pedestrian methodology and the limitations it carries, FHQ ended up where a great many of the more sophisticated models are. We will have more on this in the aftermath of the election, but for now, what has changed since June:
  • The map always seemingly had 2012 as a jumping off point. Most presidential elections tend to build on the previous elections. The order of states remains largely the same and the movement tends to be more of a uniform shift one way or the other (with exceptions -- see Utah, 2016).
  • If 2012 was the starting point, then the first map was the 2012 Obama states plus North Carolina and Arizona. Arizona pushed back across the partisan line toward Trump around the conventions and settled in. North Carolina did not. There have been fluctuations from one poll to another in the Tar Heel state, but it, too, settled into the Clinton column. 
  • Arizona was not alone in jumping the partisan line over the last few months. The general election campaign witnessed Iowa cross the partisan line into the red and never really look back. Ohio, here at FHQ anyway, was more resistant. While the Buckeye state hopped the partisan line into Trump territory just yesterday, the second debate -- the town hall debate immediately after the Access Hollywood tape was released -- was the turning point in Ohio. The polls shifted toward Trump after that point and the average here shrunk smaller and smaller over time. 
  • One final change in comparing the first and last maps was the addition of the congressional districts in Maine and Nebraska. FHQ had not previously focused any on any of them, but added them since there was some data. We will confess that it was probably not enough data, but they were added nonetheless. Adding them did shift what had been a reliably electoral vote under the statewide distribution from Maine's second congressional district to Trump's total. 
  • The tipping point state has changed over time as well. Virginia was the initial spot where either Clinton or Trump would have crossed 270 electoral votes, but that changed a number of times and often included pairs of states as things split at 269-269 over the summer. That settled down later as the order of the states along the Lean/Toss Up line on the Clinton side of the Spectrum reshuffled. Colorado has been in that position since just before the first debate. And bear in mind, while the states have changed, the position of the tipping point state has not. The order has been that stable. 

Incorrect Projections?

  • FHQ has the least confidence in a few areas. First, Ohio is very close; the closest of all the states here at FHQ. It would not be a surprise if if jumped back over the partisan line into Clinton's column. At the same time, that is not what we are predicting. 
  • Second, the lack of data from Maine's second congressional district does not inspire confidence. The recent polling has favored Clinton by narrow margins, but a handful of Trump-favorable outliers from the late summer -- even when discounted in the weighted average -- still has that one tipped toward Trump here at FHQ.
  • Tough-to-poll Nevada is always a bit of a problem child. It has been biased toward the Republican (compared to the final results) in each of the last two cycles. It would not be a shock if the Silver state is not a more comfortable win for Clinton. But again, that is not the prediction here. 


Final FHQ Margins -- 11/8/16
Strong Trump
Lean Trump
Toss Up Trump
Strong Trump
Strong Clinton
Toss Up Clinton
Strong Clinton
Strong Clinton
Toss Up Clinton
Toss Up Trump
Strong Clinton
Strong Trump
Strong Clinton
Lean Trump
Toss Up Trump
Strong Trump
Strong Trump
Strong Trump
Lean Clinton
Maine CD1
Strong Clinton
Maine CD2
Toss Up Trump
Strong Clinton
Strong Clinton
Lean Clinton
Lean Clinton
Strong Trump
Lean Trump
Strong Trump
Strong Trump
Toss Up Clinton
New Hampshire
Toss Up Clinton
New Jersey
Strong Clinton
New Mexico
Lean Clinton
New York
Strong Clinton
North Carolina
Toss Up Clinton
North Dakota
Strong Trump
Toss Up Trump
Strong Trump
Lean Clinton
Toss Up Clinton
Rhode Island
Strong Clinton
South Carolina
Lean Trump
South Dakota
Strong Trump
Strong Trump
Lean Trump
Lean Trump
Strong Clinton
Lean Clinton
Strong Clinton
Washington, DC
Strong Clinton
West Virginia
Strong Trump
Lean Clinton
Strong Trump

The Electoral College Spectrum1
(272 | 275)
(301 | 266)
(316 | 237)
(322 | 222)
1 Follow the link for a detailed explanation on how to read the Electoral College Spectrum.

2 The numbers in the parentheses refer to the number of electoral votes a candidate would have if he or she won all the states ranked prior to that state. If, for example, Trump won all the states up to and including Colorado (all Clinton's toss up states plus Colorado), he would have 275 electoral votes. Trump's numbers are only totaled through the states he would need in order to get to 270. In those cases, Clinton's number is on the left and Trumps's is on the right in bold italics.
To keep the figure to 50 cells, Washington, DC and its three electoral votes are included in the beginning total on the Democratic side of the spectrum. The District has historically been the most Democratic state in the Electoral College.

3 Maine and Nebraska allocate electoral college votes to candidates in a more proportional manner. The statewide winner receives the two electoral votes apportioned to the state based on the two US Senate seats each state has. Additionally, the winner within a congressional district is awarded one electoral vote. Given current polling, all five Nebraska electoral votes would be allocated to Trump. In Maine, a split seems more likely. Trump leads in Maine's second congressional district while Clinton is ahead statewide and in the first district. She would receive three of the four Maine electoral votes and Trump the remaining electoral vote. Those congressional district votes are added approximately where they would fall in the Spectrum above.

4 Colorado is the state where Clinton crosses the 270 electoral vote threshold to win the presidential election. That line is referred to as the victory line. Currently, Colorado is in the Toss Up Clinton category.

NOTE: Distinctions are made between states based on how much they favor one candidate or another. States with a margin greater than 10 percent between Clinton and Trump are "Strong" states. Those with a margin of 5 to 10 percent "Lean" toward one of the two (presumptive) nominees. Finally, states with a spread in the graduated weighted averages of both the candidates' shares of polling support less than 5 percent are "Toss Up" states. The darker a state is shaded in any of the figures here, the more strongly it is aligned with one of the candidates. Not all states along or near the boundaries between categories are close to pushing over into a neighboring group. Those most likely to switch -- those within a percentage point of the various lines of demarcation -- are included on the Watch List below.

The Watch List1
from Lean Trump
to Toss Up Trump
from Lean Trump
to Strong Trump
from Strong Trump
to Lean Trump
from Toss Up Clinton
to Toss Up Trump
New Hampshire
from Toss Up Clinton
to Lean Clinton
from Toss Up Trump
to Toss Up Clinton
from Lean Clinton
to Strong Clinton
from Toss Up Clinton
to Lean Clinton
from Lean Trump
to Strong Trump
1 Graduated weighted average margin within a fraction of a point of changing categories.

Recent Posts:
The Electoral College Map (11/7/16)

The Electoral College Map (11/6/16)

The Electoral College Map (11/5/16)

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